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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
DON ADAMSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UNITED MINE WORKERS 0'F 
AMERI'CA, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 8161 
Brief of Defendant and Respondent 
The parties will be referred to as they appeared below, 
the appellant herein being the plaintiff, and the respondent 
the defendant. 
The figures in parentheses ref,er to the page number 
of the Record. 
The word ''International" as hereinafter used refers to 
the defendant, which is the United Mine Workers of Ameri-
ca, International Union. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The statements of the case and facts contained in the 
plaintiff's brief omit many of the pertinent facts and do not 
therefore fully and accurately fleflect the Record. We, there-
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fore, deem it advisable to make an adequate presentation 
of the Record. 
The plaintiff brought this action against the United 
Mine Workers of Ainerica, International Union, (122). Its 
offices are in Washington, D. C., and not Price, Utah, as 
plaintiff states on Page 1 of his brief. The United Mine 
Workers of America, District 22, consists of local unions 
chartered by International and situated in the states of 
Utah and Wyoming. The main district offioe is at Rock 
Springs, Wyoming, but said District also maintains an of-
fice at Price, Utah (168). District 22 is autonomous and has 
its own officers, to-wit: the President, Secretary and Treas-
urer, who reside at Rock Springs, Wyoming. The Vice Pres-
ident of said District resides in Carbon County, Utah. In 
1952, the year involved herein, the office of District Vice 
President was vacant. Harry Mangus and Frank Sacco were 
serving by appointment of the District Executive Board on 
alternate months as acting Vioe Presidents ( 4, 98). In addi-
tion to the District's officers mentioned above, there is an 
Executive Board for District 22, elected within the district 
(Exhibit "A", P. 7). Some of the members on this Board 
reside in Wyoming and some in Utah. Harry Mangus was 
such a board member for said District at the time of the 
alleged occurrences herein (96, 110, 122). 
The only person from the District directly connected 
with the defendant (International Union) is an International 
Executive Board Member (Exh. "A," p. 12). In other words, 
the District elects one of its members to serve on the Inter-
national Executive Board every four years,; this person is 
known as an International Executive Board Member, and is 
an officer of International. This is the officer referred to in 
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the Constitution under Article VII entitled Officers (Exh. 
"A"). There is a distinction between a District Board Mem-
ber who serves on the governing body of the District, and 
this one International Executiv·e Board Member. Apparent-
ly, plaintiff has confused the two on Page 6 of his brief 
under Subdivision (b). Mr. Mangus was not the Interna-
tional Executive Board Member, but only the District Board 
Member. The record shows that at the tim·e of the alleged 
occurrences, the office of International Executive Board 
Member was vacant, having been vacated in 1951 by Mal-
colm Condie (127, 128). In 1953 his successor was elected, 
but did not take office until April 1954 (128). We wish to 
emphasize that the defendant herein is the United Mine 
Workers of America, International Union, only. District 22 
of the United Mine Workers of America and Wellington Lo-
cal Union to whom the employees of the Coal Creek Coal 
Company, and its successor the Eastern Utah Cbal Company 
belonged, are not defendants herein. 
It appears from the record that Harry Mangus, an of-
ficer of District 22, was confused as to whether this suit 
was against the International Union or District 22 (113). 
The reason for the confusion apparently is that both of said 
unions are designated in part by the title of United Mine 
Workers of Am·erica, and process herein was finally served 
upon Frank Sacco, an officer of District 22 at Price, Utah. 
(See Sheriff's Return, p. 4 of Record). w.e suggest that if 
the plaintiff had added the word "International" after the 
words "United Mine Workers of America" in the Complaint 
and Summons, it is very likely this confusion would have 
been avoided. 
Plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, al-
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leging in substance, among other things, that on or about 
April 6, 1952, the defendant established a picket line at a 
junction of a road, about ten miles from, but leading to the 
mine of the Eastern Utah Coal Company in Carbon County, 
Utah; that said pickets blockaded the only road leading to 
said mine; that some of said pickets forced plaintiff to ac-
company them from said mine where he was working to 
said picket line, and that plaintiff was held captive against 
his will for about two hours; that while he was so held cap-
tive, he was threatened, intimidated, and ordered to leave 
the county and never to return if he valued his life. Plain-
tiff alleges that some of the pickets who came to the mine 
were armed; plaintiff also alleges other indignities and 
claims certain damage·s (7, 8). 
We call the Court's attention to the fact that the evi-
dence does not support plaintiff's contentions that the de-
fendant established or maintained the picket line, nor does 
it show that the defendant committed any of the acts de-
tailed in the Complaint. There is also no allegation that any 
purported agent of the defendant committed the above acts 
in the scope or course of his employment. Furthermore, no 
ratification is alleged. 
Briefly, defendant's Answer, after admitting there was 
a picket line on the date and at the place aforesaid, denies 
that said pick,ets were its representatives, or that they were 
authoriz,ed in any manner whatsoever to represent the de-
fendant (10, 11). 
Defendant further alleged in substance, among other 
things, that on the date aforesaid, and for some time prior 
thereto, there had been and was a labor dispute between the 
operators and employees of the Coal Creek Coal Company; 
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that at an election held among said employees, they had 
voted to join the United Mine Workers of America; that 
said Company was notified, but thereafter ref:used to sign 
a contract, to meet and bargain collectively with ~said em.:. 
ployees to arrange terms and conditions of employment, 
and defaulted in a payroll ; that said employees for said 
reasons on their own individual initiativ~e called a work stop-
page at said mine; that while the same was in progress, the 
E·astern Utah Coal Company took over the mining opera-
tions of the former, with knowledge of said labor dispute, 
election, and work stoppage, but nevertheless brought cer-
tain non-union men to work and take over the jobs of an 
equal numher of said employees; that said work stoppage 
was continued against said Eastern Utah Coal Company for 
said reason, upon the individual initiative and under the di-
rection of said employees; that the defendant did not au-
thorize, direct, or participate therein; that defendant did 
not participate or authori'ze any of the alleged wrongful 
acts allegedly committed against the plaintiff, did not rat-
ify the same, and had no actual knowl·edge thereof; that 
defendant did not authorize any individual to r·epresent it 
on the picket line, and did not have any authorized agents 
or servants in, near, or at said picket line; defendant did 
not authorize the said work stoppag.e, and did not control 
or dominate any of the persons involved therein ; that de-
fendant was informed and believes that the local union of-
ficers cautioned the pickets that all picketing should be done 
peaceably, and that no firearms would be permitted; that 
defendant likewise cautioned to the same eff.ect, which is 
customary when any members are on a picket line whether 
defendant authorized or called the work stoppage, or other-
wise (12, 13, 14). This is a standard instruction from In-
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ternational as well as the District (118, 119). 
The evidence shows that the picket line was actually 
on a public road, six to seven miles from the mining prop-
erty (72, 73). We submit that the evidence supports the 
allegations of defendant's answer. 
The only question involved in this appeal is whether 
or not the plaintiff established an agency relationship be-
tween the person or persons who allegedly committed the 
false imprisonment and assault upon plaintiff, and the de-
fendant herein. 
This is an appeal from a ruling of the trial Court grant-
ing the defendant's Motion to Dismiss the action upon the 
ground that the plaintiff failed to establish an agency re-
lationship which would tend to connect the defendant with 
the occurrences which the plaintiff alleges took place on or 
about April 6, 1952 (171). It is defendant's position that 
the evidence does not establish an agency relationship, and 
that the Court's ruling should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The real question herein is, Who committed these 
wrongful acts of which complaint is made, if they were in 
fact committed? In view of the pleadings, it is incumbent 
upon plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the picket line was established or maintained by de-
fendant by and through its duly authorized agents acting 
within the scope of their employment. See Mecham on 
Agency, Book 1, 2nd Edit., Sec. 255; 3 C.J.S. 297, 298, Sec. 
328 .Defendant contends that the evidence conclusively 
shows that the picket line was established and maintained 
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by the employees of the Coal Creek Coal Company and its 
successor, the Eastern Utah Coal Company, and was the 
voluntary and individual action of said employees ( 64, 65, 
66, 67, 68) . The evidence further shows that the men on the 
picket line were acting entirely on their own initiativ:e to 
protect their jobs (67). No agency whatsoever is shown by 
the evidence which connects the picketing in any manner 
with the defendant. Not only does the evidence show that 
the picketing was the voluntary and individual action of 
the said employees and to protect their jobs, but in addition 
thereto, Arnold Skinner, one of the plaintiff's witnesses, 
testified that to his knowledge no financial assistance was 
received from the defendant to finance the work stoppage 
or strike (64), and f.urther that to his knowledge neither 
the defendant nor District 22 had anything to do with the 
establishment of said picket line (66); that he had never 
seen at any time a District officer or !'lepresentative at the 
picket line (67). Furthermore, when asked who directed 
the movement of the m·en on the picket line and who had 
charg.e of the m,en, he testified that the men thems·elves 
would get together and talk it over, and he ·explained he 
meant the men involved in the "shut-out" (67). We wish 
to emphasize that this evidence was brought out by the 
plaintiff on direct examination, and clearly negatives any 
principal-agency relationship whatsoever between the de-
fendant and those who aHegedly committed the wrongful 
acts. 
Even if the Court is satisfi,ed that these m·en on the 
picket line were members of the defendant organization, 
certainly that fact standing alone would not in and of 
itself make the defendant liable for their action or con-
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duct (31 Am. Jur. 982, Sec. 300; Sweetman v. Barrows, 161 
N.E. 272, 62 A.L.R. 311), unless the same were authorized 
by the defendant, or unless they were agents of the de-
fendant acting within the scope of their employment, or 
unless the defendant with full knowledge thereof did ratify 
and intend to ratify the same. We submit that the evidence 
does not establish any of said elements. The question of 
ratification will be discussed hereafter. There is no testi-
mony that any member of the picket line was an agent of 
the defendant and the record is lacking in testimony that 
any of these men on the picket line was acting in the 
course of any employment whatsoever. As above stated, 
the evidence is that they were acting on their own initiative 
to protect their jobs. 
Not only is there a total lack of evidence that the al-
leged principal, to-wit: the defendant herein, in any manner 
authoriz.ed or participated in the conduct complained of on 
the part of the pickets, but the evidence does not show that 
the defendant even knew of such alleged conduct at the 
time it allegedly occurred. 
On p. 2 of his brief, plaintiff states that a picket line 
of 150-200 men was established on or about April 6, 1952, 
across the road leading to said mine, citing R. 87. (Actually 
the record shows at said page that there were 150 men, 
maybe more, maybe less), but no attempt is made by plain-
tiff to show who, under the evidence, established said pick-
et line, in spite of the fact that this is the decisive question 
in this case. The references we have made above to the 
record clearly show that the employees themselves estab-
lished and maintained the picket line, and not the defendant 
or any agent thereof. 
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Furthermore, plaintiff points out on p. 3 of his brief, 
that the men (on the picket line) came from various places 
throughout the county. This fact is of little significance in 
view of plaintiff's evidence that many men came to the 
picket line out of curiosity. "You know how men are, they 
get curious, come to see what is going on, come to visit, 
stand around and talk a little bit, and take off (60) ." 
Plaintiff, on p. 3 of his brief, alleges that prior to April 
6, 1952, Harry Mangus and other officers went to the mine 
attempting to organize it and threatened to prevent any 
coal from going down the canyon. Also, plaintiff states the 
men were representatives of the United Mine Workers of 
America, as brought out on cross-examination. 
The evidence establishes that Harry Mangus and Frank 
Sacco were officers of District 22 only. Neither of these 
men were agents of the defendant acting within the course 
of any employment. Skinner, Rice, and Olson, who are the 
other officers referred to by the plaintiff above, were of-
ficers of Wellington Local Union. Furthermore, Mangus 
testified he talked to the men at the mine on April 4, 1952, 
which is the occasion to which plaintiff has reference ,and 
answered their questions, not in any particular capacity, 
but on his own knowledge and on his own volition. (In other 
words, he was acting on his own) (103, 104). Therefore, 
where is the evidence connecting defendant with this visit 
to the mine, or proving any agency whatsoever? 
The evidence shows that no representative from de-
fendant was present at any of the negotiations for a con-
tract, nor during the picketing (106). The title ''United Mine 
Workers of America" applies to every coal miner who be-
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longs to the local, district or International unions. However, 
even if we assume that Mangus, Skinner, Rice, and Olson, 
when they allegedly told Austin Beal they were represent-
atives of the United Mine Workers of Am·erica meant to 
convey the impression that they were representing the de-
fendant (94), as distinguished from the local or district or-
ganization of said Mine Workers, still agency cannot be 
shown by the mere declarations of the alleged agent. This 
Court has said that this rule is elementary. Cronquist v. 
Smith, 42 U. 575, 133 P. 130. See also Ephraim Willow 
Creek Irr. Co. v. Olson, 258 P. 216, 222, 70 U. 95. We submit 
there was no prima facie showing of agency by other evi-
dence. Meyer v. Kirkwood, 38 P. 2d 866, subsequent of 48 P. 
2d 30. 
The contract (Exh. "B") was signed on April 7, 1952, 
between the representatives of the district and local unions 
and management (106). Certain provisions thereof apply 
to the district and local organizations (Exh. ''B", p. 7), 
which is undoubtedly one reason why representatives there-
of affixed their signatures to the contract. Also, it is cus-
tomary for both International and District officers to sign 
a contract (127). No representative from International was 
shown to have been present at any of the negotiations (106). 
The same, therefore, must have been submitted to Interna-
tional at a later date for approval. No contract is binding 
as far as International is concerned without its approval 
(127). If Mangus was a duly authorized agent of Inter-
national, why could he not have signed the contract on be-
half of the defendant? The contract itself shows that Man-
gus and Sacco signed on behalf of District 22 only (E·xh. 
"B". Also 125). '• 
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In connection with the signing of the contract, plaintiff 
states that the same was signed between the Coal Company 
and International, all as a resu},t of the threats, violence, 
and strike activities. The evidence, however, is that all 
meetings leading up to the signing of the contract were har-
monious and pleasant (101, 152). These negotiations for a 
contract had been going on since about March 20, 1952, or 
prior thereto (161), and there is no justification in the evi-
dence for saying the contract was the result of threats, vio-
lence and strike activities. Also, since the operator was able 
to make out a list of the men from Salina he wanted to re-
tain and the local union submitted a list it ·chose to remain 
at work (164, 166, 167), "and between the two lists we 
worked out a crew" (167), the agreement appears at best to 
have been a compromise arrived at after considerable dis-
cussion and negotiation. 
Plaintiff, immediately after the above assertion, al-
leges on p. 3 of his brief, that the ne~t day following the 
signing of the agreement, the pickets were taken off by Mr. 
Mangus (citing p. 167). However, Mr. Reichert's testimony 
on said page is to the effect that, "Mr. Mangus, delegated 
I believe, Skinner and Rice (officers of Wellington Local 
to whom the employees belonged) to round up the men so 
that we could go to work in the morning." The witness also 
testified that Mangus said that the picket line would be 
broken up and that everyone would be able to go through, 
and that the witness believed Mangus delegated a man to 
see that it was cleared (167). (Note: Mangus did not say 
he would break up the picket line.) 
However, plaintiff's witness, Mangus, gives us an en-
tirely different version. In answer to a question as to whe-
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ther he told Mr. Reichert that he (Mangus) would remove 
the pickets, Mangus replied, "Yes, I believe I told Mr. Rei-
chert if I had any jurisdiction of any pickets (emphasis 
ours) , I would remove them, and furthermore I would like 
to state that I told Mr. Reichert at that time that I was 
sure that the trials and tribulations pertaining to his mine, 
if any agreement was negotiated, that they wouldn't have 
any picketing of any sort or nature whatsoever (107) ." 
Also, Mr. Mangus testified as follows: 
"Q. When were the pickets tarken off? 
A. That I couldn't say. I believe there was pickets 
on their own, and I felt if they knew an agreement was con-
summated between the United Mine Workers and Mr. Rei-
chert, that those that were on the picket line would leave 
on their own volition (107)" 
From the last quoted portion of Mr. Mangus' testimony, 
it is apparent that Mr. Mangus felt that the pickets would 
leave on their own volition and would not have to be re-
moved when they learned that a contract had been nego-
tiated. There is no evidence he himself removed them. 
Even Mr. Reichert's testimony was to the effect that Man-
gus "delegated" to members of the local the job of getting 
the men back to work (167). 
We search the record in vain for any evidence that 
Mangus received any orders from International regarding 
the contract or with reference to any matter leading up 
thereto. As heretofore stated, Mangus testified he was not 
answering questions in any particular capacity, but from 
his own knowledge, and that he was actually visiting there 
(at the mine on April 4, 1952) (103, 104). Mr. Skinner tes-
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tified that he, Rice and Olson asked Mr. Mangus to go up to 
the mine on April 4, 1952, to explain the benefits of belong-
ing to the union since he was better versed on such matters, 
and to avoid misstatements and misconceptions (69). 
Therefore, Mr. Mangus was acting in behalf of Skinner, 
Rice and Olson on said occasion. He was not there as an 
agent of International or even the District. Mr. Mangus 
himself also testified he was not representing the Interna-
tional Union, which is the defendant herein (122). His tes-
timony in this regard as plaintiff's witness is certainly com-
petent. 
Otto Reichert, one of the owners of the mine, also 
stated he knew that Mangus was representing the United 
Mine Workers of America in some capacity, but he didn't 
know which (emphasis ours). He also testified that 
he knew Mangus was in the District office (145, 146). 
Ronald Reichert's testimony contains the statement 
that he didn't "know of any International or wh.at would be 
District and International (168) ." 
We have gone somewhat into detail quoting the testi-
mony of Harry Mangus for the reason that plaintiff's cas·e 
appears to be built upon the erroneous assumption that 
Harry Mangus was representing the International Union in 
all that he said or did with respect to the negotiations for 
and the execution of the contract, as well as other matters, 
whereas the evidence clearly shows that fr~m time to time 
Mangus was representing either the District, the officers 
of Wellington Local, i.e., Skinner, Rice and Olson, or was 
acting on his own initiative. When he signed Exh. "B", the 
contract, he signed it in his capacity as acting Vice Presi-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
dent of District 22 only. We have his unequivocal statement 
that he was not representing International, which we have 
cited above. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL 
Point I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE-
ACTION UPON THE GROUNDS OF 
LACK OF AGENCY 
Point II 




The Court did not ·err in dismissing the action upon 
the grounds of lack of agency. 
Our position is that under the evidence, no agency was 
shown. Also, the evidence was not conflicting on the ques-
tion of agency. 
Plaintiff cites Goddard v. Lexington Motor Company, 
223 P. 340; 63 U. 161, and the authorities cited in 3 C.J.S. 
Section 330. The material facts in the Goddard case are: 
Matthews was intermountain representative of Lex-
ington Motor Company, a manufacturer and seller of cars. 
Appellant contracted with a dealer for purchase of a car. 
Before shipment, said dealer retired from the transaction. 
The car, with others, was shipped by Lexington Motor Com-
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pany to Ogden consigned to itself. A draft was drawn on 
Matthews for all cars shipped, including the one involved in 
this case. When shipment was made, Lexington Motor 
Company wired Matthews : "Shipment made Ogden yester-
day. Not knowing conditions there draft drawn on you 
through bank specified Ogden by dealer. Trust you will 
handle satisfactorily." 
The car could not be inspected until the draft was paid. 
Matthews told appellant if he advanced the purchase price, 
the Bill of Lading would be released, and he could examine 
the car and if it was not satisfactory, he could return it and 
his money would be refunded. Appellant agreed and upon 
inspection found the car defective and demanded the return 
of the purchase price. 
The main question in this case was whether the evi-
dence of authority of Matthews to bind respondent by his 
agreement with appellant was sufficient to be submitted to 
the jury. The trial court granted a non-suit. 
This court points out: that Matthews knew the details 
of the situation with appellant; the wire from the company 
stated "Trust you will handle satisfactorily;" Matthews 
stated he had no personal interest in the matter, except as a 
representative of the company ... he said he was repre-
senting the factory; that Goddard was dealing directly 
with the company. The shipment was consigned to Lexing-
ton Motor Company. Matthews endorsed the Bill of Lading 
by signing the company's name by M. Matthews, Mgr. All 
cars contained in shipment were not delivered to purchasers, 
and those undelivered were in charge of Matthews. 
This court held the evidence was sufficient to show 
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prima facie, that Matthews was entrusted with the car with 
authority to sell it, and that in so doing under, the circum-
stances, had apparent authority to make the agreement that 
if the car, after inspection, was not satisfactory, it could be 
returned, and the purchase price refunded. 
The distinguishable feature between the Goddard case 
and the case at bar is that in the former, the principal had 
wired authority to Matthews to handle the matter. In the 
Adamson case, no communication or orders whatsoever were 
received from the alleged principal, to-wit: International, 
and the evidence fails to connect International with any of ' 
the alleged wrongful acts or any other transactions. I· 
In 3 C.J .S., Section 330, p. 323, referred to by plaintiff, 
the general rul~e is therein cited as follows: "Agency is a 
question of fact to be determined by the jury or other trier 
of facts unless no competent evidenc·e legally sufficient to 
prov~e it has been introduced or the material facts from 
which it is to be inferred are undisputed and only one 
conclusion can be reasonably drawn therefrom." However, 
this same authority at p. 325 states, "On the other hand, 
agency is a question of law for the Court where the material 
facts from which it is to be inferred are not in dispute, and 
only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom. 
Whether or not there is any competent evidence reasonably 
tending to prove the existence of an agency is for the court 
to determine; and, if there is none, or if it is so slight that 
a finding thereon of the existence of the agency would not 
be sustained, the question may and should be disposed of 
by the court alone and not be submitted to the jury" (Em-
phasis ours). Apparently, counsel has entirely overlooked 
the portion of the rule we have emphasized above, which we 
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believe applies to this case. See also Cerchio v. Mullins, 
138 A. 277 (Del.); Lake Grocery Company v. Chiostri, 158 
N.W. 998 (N. D.); Godfrey v. Ziemak, 18 Pa. Dist. & Co. 
195. See also the numerous cases cited in 3 C.J-S., Section 
330, p. 326, footnote 54. 
We point out that in 3 C.J.S. 326, the author states 
that the question of whether a certain written instrument, 
which is clear and unambiguous is sufficient to ·create the 
relation of principal and agent is one of law for the court. 
Under this authority, it was proper for the ·court to con-
strue Exhs. ''A" and "B" in the Adamson case and to 
determine whether the same were sufficient to create the 
relation of principal and agent. 
Counsel also cites California Jewelry Company v. Mc-
Donald, 30 P. 2d 778 (Ida.). In this Idaho case the Court 
said: "It appears that considerable ·correspondence between 
Kelley and appellant was introduced in ·evidence, which cor-
respondence is susceptible of different conclusion being 
drawn therefrom as to whether Kelley was an agent of ap-
pellant, or an independent dealer. In addition thereto, 
there is evidence that Kelley held himself out as such 
agent; the deposition of Mr. Levison connected with ap-
pellant, contains the statements: That they had done busi-
ness with Mr. Kelley before, for several years, sending him 
jewelry purchased as well as for sale~ that in this instance 
'we sent it to him naturally for sale;' that the ring was 
sent 'on approval;' and that 'we owned the ring at the time 
of the sale.' " 
The Court said: ''It cannot be logically contended that 
there is no substantial conflict in the evidence as to the 
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existence of an agency between Kelley and appellant." ... p. 
780. 
In the Adamson case, the evidence does not show a long 
course of dealing, and we do not have any evidence on the 
part of the alleged principal which is susceptible of being 
interpreted to mean that there was an agency relationship 
between the defendant herein and Harry Mangus, or the 
pickets. Therefore, the Idaho case does not assist plaintiff. 
Plaintiff states on p. 5 of his brief that there is 
"strong" evidence in the record that the Local and District 
organizations are under the control of the defendant (em-
phasis ours). Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution of the Inter-
national (Exh. "A") is cited to the effect that all Districts, 
Sub-districts and Local Unions must be chartered by and be 
under the jurisdiction of and subject to the laws of Inter-
national and rulings of the International Executive Board 
... Section 3 provides that if an individual is ruled against 
by the local, he may appeal to International. 
It is true that District and Local Unions are chartered 
by International. The various States charter corporations, 
but this does not necessarily make the corporations agents 
of the State. Furthermore, the mere fact that Districts and 
Locals may be under the jurisdiction of International's laws 
and rulings does not necessarily mean they are general 
agents of International. It is true that International has 
the final say on certain matters of policy and in the event 
the District or Locals take action repugnant to the Consti-
tution of International, the latter must prevail. Even though 
it be conceded that the local unions and the districts are 
under the jurisdiction of the International generally, there 






Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
directed the local union or the district to establish or carry 
on the picket line. All plaintiff's evidence is to the con-
trary as aforesaid. Therefore, these constitutional provi-
sions cited do not assist plaintiff in attempting to ·establish 
an agency relationship between the defendant and the per-
sons who committed the said wrongful acts, in the absence 
of any evidence showing that the defendant directed or 
authorized the local union or District 22 to do said acts 
or to participate therein. 
Plaintiff further cites on p. 5 of his brief, Article XVI, 
Sec. 1 of the Constitution (E-xh. "A"), which gives author-
ity to the District to call strikes provided the same are au-
thorized by International. These provisions do not have 
any material significance in this case for the reason that 
there is no evidence tending to show that the District 
called any strike herein, nor that the District had anything 
whatsoever to do therewith. Plaintiff's witness, Arnold 
Skinner, testified that he became quite indignant because 
he never saw at any time any District officer or represent-
ative at the picket line, and that he asked them "if they 
was interested in what we was doing and they would never 
give me any help (67) ." 
In subdivision (b) of plaintiff's brief, p. 6, the plaintiff 
points out that the Constitution provides that the Executive 
Board Member from each of the Districts is an officer of 
International and that Harry Mangus signed an affidavit as 
Executive District Board Member and as an officer of the 
defendant. (Note: Mangus' title was Executive District 
Board Member.) (E-mphasis ours.) (The affidavit was one 
of the grounds for Change of Venue of the original action 
from Salt Lake County to Carbon County.) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
Article VII of the Constitution has been misconstrued 
by plaintiff which refers to certain officers as constituting 
the International Executive Board. We have heretofore 
pointed out that Mr. Mangus was not an Executive Board 
Member of International, but only a Board Member of Dis-
trict 22. The mere fact that Mr. Mangus signed an affidavit 
for Change of Venue certainly does not establish a principal-
agent relationship herein. See Climax Dairy Company v. 
Mulder, 242 P. 666, 78 Colo. 407. Furthermore, Mr. Mangus 
signed said affidavit as a District Board Member, not as an 
officer of the defendant, as plaintiff alleges (110). He did 
not pretend to represent International. He testified on di-
rect examination that in all of his conduct herein he was 
not representing the defendant, and that he was an officer 
of District 22 only. He signed the contract (Exh. ''B") as an 
officer of said District only. He went to the mine on April 
4, 1952, at the request of the officers of Wellington Local, 
as above set forth. There is no evidence showing that de-
fendant either knew that he went there, or that it author-
ized him to speak or act in its behalf, or that it clothed him 
with any authority whatsoever to represent the defendant. 
Agency may be ultimately established only by tracing its 
source to some word or act of the alleged principal. Brutinel 
v. Nygren, 154 P. 1042, 17 Ariz. 491; Litchfield v. Green 
(Ariz.) 33 P. 2d 290; 3 C.J .S. 302, Sec. 328. 
From the final paragraph contained on p. 7 of plain-
tiff's brief, plaintiff contents himself by saying that on the 
general question of agency sufficient facts were put in evi-
dence to show the agency relationship between Internation-
al and the District officer (Harry Mangus) and certainly, 
at least, to rebut all inferences, or presumptions that there 
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is no agency whatsoever. We do not find from the evidence 
any showing that Harry Mangus was an agent of Interna-
tional acting within the scope of his employment. Further-
more, the evidence does not disclose that Harry Mangus had 
any control whatsoever over the picket line. We submit that 
the evidence shows no principal-agent relationship whatso-
ever, and that the wrongs complained of, if they were ·COm-
mitted at all, were committed by persons who are unidenti-
fied and who were not in any way authori·zed by Interna-
tional to commit them ; that International had no knowl-
edge of said acts, and did not participate therein. 
In plaintiff's desperation to find some evidence of agen-
cy, he refers to the incident where Mangus, Skinner, Rice, 
and Olson went to the mine of the Eastern Utah Coal Com-
pany and stated to one of plaintiff's witnesses (Austin Beal) 
that they were representatives of the United Mine Workers 
of America (brief, pp. 3 & 8). Of course, since this broad 
title is borne by members of the Local, District, as well as 
International, this statement in and of itself cannot be con-
strued as meaning International only. In the event such 
statement was made, we would have to stretch our imagina-
tion to the breaking point in order to construe the same as 
meaning to convey the impression that they were agents of 
International. The logical and reasonable construction of 
such statement would seem to be that they belonged to the 
District or Local of said United Mine Workers. 
Be that as it may, the authorities hold that the admis-
sions, statements, and declarations of an agent other than 
his testimony in the case where the issue arises, are not 
admissible to prove agency (80 A.L .. R. 604) ; it has also been 
held that there must be prima facie proof of agency before 
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such statements or declarations are admissible for any pur-
pose (Cronquist v. Smith, supra; State v. Kelly (N.M.) 202 
P. 524). Therefore, the purported statement was not actu-
ally admissible, but was admitted subject to plaintiff's 
promise that he would connect the same with the defendant 
organization at a later time, which he entirely failed to do. 
Both the operators of the Eastern Utah Coal Company 
testified that they did not know the capacity in which Har-
ry Mangus acted. It would be fair to state that both of them 
merely assumed that he had authority to act for Interna-
tional. However, agency must be based upon evidence, not 
presumption (Mecham on Agency, supra). 
Mr. Mangus did not state to them that he repre-
sented the defendant. Certainly the defendant did not 
at any time acknowledge Mr. Mangus to be an agent and 
did not communicate any authority to him to act in this 
case. Under the atbove circumstances, the holding in Dohr-
mann Supp,Jy Company v. Beau Brummel, Inc. (Utah) 103 
P. 2d 650, applies, wherein this Court held that a person 
dealing with a supposed agent is bound to ascertain his ca-
pacity. Also, that the acts or representations of a sales 
representative cannot enlarge the scope of the representa-
tive's agency. Neither of the mine operators made any ef-
fort whatsoever to ascertain in what capacity Mr. Mangus 
was acting. He has testified that he was acting for the 
District only, and not for the defendant. It was Reichert's 
duty to ascertain his capacity under the rule announced in 
the Beau Brummel case. 
There is a general rule of law that a union is not re-
sponsible for the unlawful act of individual members, which 
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neither its officers nor committees directed or approved, 
unless it was committed in carrying out their orders, or 
unless it was an act contemplated as a probable incident of 
an authorized strike. See 31 Am. Jur. 980, Sec. 296. There 
is also a general rule of law that the fact of agency cannot 
be established by proof of the acts of the professed agent 
in the absence of evidence tending to show the principal's 
knowledge of such acts or assent to them. (2 Am. Jur. 351, 
352, Sec. 444. 
We wish to call the Court's attention to Sec. 34-1-26, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which reads as follows: 
"No officer or member of any association or organ-
ization, or no association or organization participat-
ing or interested in a labor dispute (as these terms 
are herein defined) shall be held responsible or lia-
ble in any civil action at law or suit in equity, or in 
any criminal prosecution for the unlawful acts of 
individuals officers, members, or agents, except up-
on proof by the weight of evidence and without the 
aid of any presumptions of law or fact, both of (a) 
the doing of such acts by persons who are officers, 
members, or agents of any such association or or-
ganization, and (b) actual participation in, or ac-
tual authorization of, such acts, or ratification of 
such acts after actual knowledge thereof by such 
association or organization." 
From the above statute it appears that the plaintiff 
must show that the persons who committed the alleged 
wrongful acts were either officers, members, or agents of 
the defendant, and that the defendant actually participated 
in or actually authorized the same, or ratified the same af-
ter actual knowledge thereof by the defendant. We sub-
mit that the plaintiff has not produced any such proof. 
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Point II 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW 
ANY RATIFICATION 
We cite what we deem to be the controlling Utah case 
on this question, to-wit: Jones v. Mutual Creamery Com-
pany, 81 U. 273, 17 P. 2d 256, 85 A.L.R. 908. In the Jones 
case, 2 C.J. 467 is quoted approvingly to the effect that 
"ratification as it relates to the law of agency may be de-
fined as the express or implied adoption and confirmation 
by one person of an act or contract performed or entered 
into in his behalf by another who at the time assumed to 
act as his agent in doing the act or making the contract, 
without authority to do so. The substance of a ratification 
is confirmation after conduct; it confirms; it neither 
changes the contract nor makes a new one with different 
terms." 
The Jones case further states: "It is also well recog-
nized that, in order that a ratification of an unauthori·zed 
act or transaction of an agent or of another may be valid 
and binding, it is essential that the principal or the person 
making the ratification had full knowledge at the time of 
the ratification of all material facts and circumstances rel-
ative to the unauthorized act or transaction (2 C.J. 
476), and also that an intention to ratify is essential 
and which must be shown either by an express or by an 
implied ratification (2 C. J. 484, 492)." 
In the first place, the evidence in the case at bar does 
not support a finding that Harry Mangus, or anyone else, 
was acting as the agent of the defendant without authority, 
or that he, or anyone else, pretended to act as such agent. 
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We fail to find any evidence in the record that the alleged 
principal had knowledge at any time of any or all the ma-
terial facts with respect to the grievances mentioned, or 
that the defendant intended to ratify any torts, or any 
other acts. Without such evidence, there can be no ratifi-
cation under the Jones case. 
Plaintiff cites Kerr Gifford & Company v. American 
Distilling Company, 95 P. 2d 694 (brief, p. 7). In the Gif-
ford case, plaintiff claimed that defendant's special agent 
had entered into a contract to purchase futures in corn, 
and that defendant ratified the purported contract, relying 
on a letter written with defendant's permission. It was 
necessary to construe said letters. The court held that the 
construction of those letters rested with the trial court. 
Again, we have the question of the alleged principal 
doing something, and the necessity of the Court's interpret-
ing what the principal had authorized or sanctioned to be 
done. This is not the situation in the Adamson case, where 
the principal did nothing whatsoever as far as the evidence 
is concerned. No act on the part of the alleged principal 
needs to be construed, because the evidence does not show 
that defendant did any act whatsoever. 
As purported evidence of ratification, plaintiff cites 
the threats of violence allegedly made, the picket line and 
violent activi.ties set up, the defendant's warning against 
violence, the signing of the contract by John L. Lewis, and 
the dispersement of the pickets (brief, p. 7, 8). We have 
discussed these matters above, and do not deem it necessary 
to go into detailed discussion thereof at this point. We simp-
ly point out that the alleged threats of violence, the picket 
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line, and the so-called violent activities have in no manner 
been connected with the defendant, or with any agent of the 
defendant in the course of employment. The warning given 
against violence was, according to the evidence, a standard 
instruction as far as International was concerned, and is giv-
en whenever any members are engaged on a picket line, whe-
ther International authorized the picketing or work stop-
page, or otherwise. As to the contract being signed on 
behalf of International by John L. Lewis, there is no show-
ing made that at the time of the signing thereof he or In-
ternational had any knowledge whatsoever of the alleged 
torts. As to the dispersement of the pickets, the evidence 
shows that members of Wellington Local were "delegated" 
to get the men back to work and certainly this has not 
been connected up with International. 
In answer to plaintiff's contention that the mine own-
ers had always dealt with and only had contact with the 
District office in all dealings with the union (brief, p. 8) 
there is no showing that these operators ever dealt with 
the District on any occasion other than the one in question. 
No course of dealing has been established, and as far as 
the evidence is concerned, this is the only dealing they ever 
had with the District office. The evidence discloses that in 
this particular case, Mr. Mangus of the District Office was 
accommodating the officers of Wellington Local. The evi-
dence does not show that the owners made any effort to 
ascertain the capacity in which Mr. Mangus acted, nor that 
they were under the impression that they were dealing with 
International. In fact, one of the owners stated that he 
didn't know which was District and which was Internation-
al. As to the four men who went up to the mine allegedly 
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stating they were representatives of the United Mine Work-
ers of America (not specifically that they were representa-
tives of the defendant), we have discussed this subject 
above and will not burden the Court with any further com-
ment thereon. We refer the Court to our arguments here-
tofore made. 
Plaintiff cites Hayward v. Yost, 242 P. 2d 971 (Ida.) 
to the effect that where there are corroborative facts and 
circumstances disclosed by the evidenc-e, agency then be-
comes a question of fact for the jury. The alleged corrob-
orative facts relied upon in the Adamson case amount to 
nothing more than an attempt on the part of the plaintiff 
to impeach his own witnesses. When plaintiff called Man-
gus as a witness, and he testified he was not represent-
ing International, plaintiff tried to impeach his testimony. 
Is this corroborative evidence? 
As to the Arizona case, Maynard v. Hall, 143 P. 2d 884, 
cited by plaintiff (brief, p. 8) we have no quarrel with the 
general rule therein set forth. However, we do not find 
sufficient evidence in our case from which any inference 
of agency arises to require submission thereof to a jury. 
The Oklahoma case cited by plaintiff (brief, p. 9) also sets 
forth a general rule which we do not question. If there is 
a conflict in the evidence on the question of agency, then 
it becomes a question of fact. We do not find such conflict 
in the evidence in the Adamson case. It appears that the 
evidence is all to the effect that none of the wrongful acts 
were authorized or participated in by the defendant. 
We call the Court's attention to the requisites of rati-
fication set forth in 2 Am. Jur., pp. 175-176, S.ec. 220, 
wherein it is stated: 
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''To be effective, the principal must intend to ratify 
the unauthorized act, he must have the power of 
ratifying the act done, he must ratify the transac-
tion in its entirety, he must have knowledge of all 
the material facts surrounding the transaction to 
be ratified, the person acting in an unauthorized 
manner must purport to be acting in the matter on 
behalf of the principal, and the act itself must be 
capable of ratification." 
In VoL 2, Sec. 222, p. 177 of the same work, we find the 
statement: 
"There can be no ratification where it appears 
that the person who performed the act or made the 
contract was not at the time and did not profess 
to be acting on behalf of the alleged principal." 
We have already shown that the alleged principal had no 
knowledge of the material facts, or an intention to ratify. 
Plaintiff states (brief, p. 7) that defendant ratified 
the alleged activities by receiving the benefit of the final 
signed contract executed the day after the violence. How-
ever, in 2 Am. Jur., p. 181, Sec. 227, the author states: 
"It is an established principle of law that where a 
person acts for another who accepts or retains the 
the benefits or proceeds of his effortswith knowl-
edge of the material facts surrounding the trans-
action (emphasis ours), the latter must be deemed 
to have ratified the methods employed, as he may 
not, even though innocent, receive or retain the 
benefits and at the same time disclaim responsi-
bility for the measures by which they were ac-
quired." 
Again, 
"The acceptance or retention of benefits derived 
from an agent's unauthorized act does not amount 
to a ratification of such act if the principal, in ac-
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cepting such proceeds or benefits does not have 
knowledge of all the material facts surrounding the 
transaction" (2 Am. Jur., p. 184, Sec. 229). (Em-
phasis ours.) 
From the above principles, and the numerous authori-
ties cited in support thereof, we submit to the court that 
the evidence does not show any ratification on the part of 
the defendant herein, and that the evidence was not legally 
sufficient to submit to the jury. 
In our argument thus far, we have assumed that the 
acts complained of her·ein were subject to ratification on 
the part of the defendant. These wrongful acts consist of 
assault, battery, and false imprisonment on the part of 
the pickets. Plaintiff so states on p. 1 of his brief. As-
sault, battery, and false imprisonment are crimes in the 
State of Utah. (See Sees. 76-7-1, 76-21-1 and 76-7-3, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953.) There is a serious question as to 
whether or not such acts amounting to crime ·can be rati-
fied. "Acts which cannot be legally delegated to an agent 
to perform, such as acts to be done in violation of law, or 
which would contravene public policy and which would 
amount to crimes against the state, cannot be ratified. 
The ratification which the law interdicts relates, however, 
only to such acts as clearly appear to have been done in 
violation of a criminal statute, the motive of the ratifying 
party being presumably the concealment of the crime or the 
suppression of its prosecution" (2 Am. Jur. p. 174, Sec. 218). 
See also footnote 19 at 2 Am. Jur., p. 174. 
While we firmly believe that the evidence does not 
show a ratification for the reasons above mentioned, there 
is a serious question as to whether or not the wrongful 
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acts alleged by plaintiff are subject to ratification, in view 
of the last citation, since the wrongful acts alleged are rec-
ognized by the laws of this State as being crimes against 
the State. 
WHEREFORE, defendant respectfully requests this 
Honorable Court to affirm the decision of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DART & SHEYA 
By B. L. Dart and 
Edward Sheya 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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